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Abstract
The rising importance of multinationals in the world economy has been accom-
panied by a rise in trade between aﬃliates of multinationals located in diﬀerent
countries, and by profits being shifted to low tax countries. The eﬀect of trade bar-
riers on taxation, intra firm trade and profit shifting has largely been ignored by
both the trade literature and the public finance literature. This paper analyzes how
competition over shifty profits aﬀect tax policy as trade barriers are lowered. The
main results are: (i) A reduction in trade barriers unambiguously leads to higher
tax revenue for low or intermediate levels of trade costs, and (ii) that the eﬀect on
equilibrium tax rates depends on the proportion of the corporate tax bases that is
foreign owned and how far economic integration has proceeded.
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1 Introduction
A country that cuts its tax rate on capital typically ignores the resulting fall in tax
revenue in other countries. The negative fiscal externality arising from competition among
countries to attract scarce capital is known to lead to too low taxes, a reduction in tax
revenue, underprovision of public goods, and lower welfare.1 Despite these predictions,
tax revenues on corporate income as proportion of GDP have remained stable or even
gone up for some countries since the early 1960s. A few countries have even increased
their corporate tax rates, although statutory tax rates for large samples of countries in
general show a declining trend.2
The purpose of this paper is to provide an explanation of why; (i) corporate tax
revenue has not fallen, and (ii) corporate tax rates in some countries have even risen
despite increased economic integration and the predictions from the theoretical part of
the tax competition literature that taxes and tax revenue should fall. We argue that
the modeling of tax competition has overlooked some important stylized facts about
globalization which, if taken into account, give a richer picture of the outcome of tax
competition.
First, almost the entire literature neglects the impact of reductions in all sorts of
barriers to trade (henceforth referred to as economic integration). Studies show that these
barriers are significant and thus likely to be of importance for the tax setting behavior
among countries. For example, Venables and Markusen (1998) estimate trade costs to be
10-15 percent of firms’ marginal costs. Norman (1998) concludes that the trade pattern of
market shares in European markets can be made consistent with profit maximizing firms
only if the sum of natural and artificial barriers to trade is equivalent to tariﬀs of 30-60
percent, depending on the product.
1See Wilson (1999) for a survey of the tax competition literature.
2For empirical facts related to capital mobility and taxation see e.g., Devereaux, Griﬃth and Klemm
(2002).
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Second, the literature on tax competition has largely neglected the fact that the rise in
FDI means that national tax bases have become more mobile internationally. Indeed, an
important aspect of the global economy is the strong growth of foreign direct investment
(FDI) throughout the world with surges in annual growth rates of 25 and 32 percent in the
late 80s and 90s. The rising importance of multinationals has been accompanied by a rise
in trade between aﬃliates of multinationals located in diﬀerent countries to the extent
that about 33 percent of world trade was intra-firm trade already in 1993 (Markusen
(2002, ch1)). This development has implications for the modelling of tax competition. If
globalization means that the share of foreign firms in the domestic economy rises and
these foreign firms engage in profit shifting, the tax sensitivity of the corporate tax base
increases.3 As pointed out by Markusen (2002; ch 1.), a substantial part of intra-firm trade
is in goods where arm’s length prices are not easily established. This suggests that the
cost to the firm of concealing transfer pricing is fairly low. The problem posed by profit
shifting for the fiscal autonomy of countries therefore depends on the volume of trade, the
level of trade costs, and the ease with which multinationals can shift profits.
The background provided above suggests that there is a need for a tax competition
model that embeds trade, trade costs, and transfer pricing, in order to understand how
economic integration aﬀects tax revenue and tax rates. The purpose of this paper is to
fill this gap.
The literature on tax competition in the presence of multinationals that is of relevance
to this paper can be divided into two. The first set of papers studies how transfer pricing
aﬀects tax policy. Mansori and Weichenrieder (2001) and Raimondos-Møller and Scharf
(2002) model transfer pricing regulations by two governments and investigate how transfer
pricing aﬀects equilibrium tax rates. Elitzur and Mintz (1996) discuss corporate tax com-
petition under alternative transfer pricing rules when transfer pricing aﬀects managerial
incentives as well as the overall tax payment. Haufler and Schjelderup (2000) investigate
the optimal taxation of corporate profits when governments can choose both the tax rate
and the base of the corporate tax, and multinationals shift profits by transfer pricing.
3The empirical evidence on the importance of income shifting and transfer pricing related to multina-
tionals is well documented (see e.g. Weichenrieder (1996) and Hines (1999)).
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Finally, Smart and Mintz (2001) study corporate income taxation when firms operating
in multiple jurisdictions can shift income by using financial planning strategies. Most of
these papers embed trade explicitly, but none of them incorporates the eﬀect of trade
costs on the outcome of their analysis. The second set of papers ignores both transfer
pricing and trade costs, but examines how the structure of ownership aﬀects tax policy
in the presence of multinationals. A benchmark result in this literature is that increased
foreign ownership of the tax base leads to higher equilibrium taxes.4
The purpose of this paper is to bridge the gap between the two strands of literature by
developing a model of tax competition in the presence of multinationals and profit shift-
ing, where the corporate tax base is partly foreign owned and the tax base endogenously
determined by the tax rates set by each government. Moreover, we aim to answer the one
major question that has so far been left unresolved : How does economic integration aﬀect
tax revenue and taxes?5 To answer this question we use a two-country model with trade
costs, where each country is host to a multinational firm (henceforth MNC) producing a
single consumer good. The two MNCs serve their home markets, but also export goods
to their foreign aﬃliates unless trade costs are too high. Each government sets taxes so as
to maximize national welfare, taking into consideration the strategic choices of the multi-
nationals and their ability to shift profits. We demonstrate that for low and intermediate
levels of trade costs, economic integration increases the corporate tax revenue, but has
an ambiguous eﬀect on tax rates depending on the ownership structure of the corporate
tax base. Economic integration reduces the corporate tax rate if MNCs are owned by
residents of a foreign country, while it increases equilibrium taxes if MNCs are owned by
home country residents.6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the modelling framework and
explores the impact of economic integration on equilibrium tax rates and tax revenues,
4See Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) and Olsen and Osmundsen (2001) in a setting of asymmetric infor-
mation.
5In this paper we will take the location of the multinational as given. A complementary question
is how economic integration may aﬀect the localization pattern of multinational corporations. See e.g.,
Neary (2002) for an analysis.
6Home country refers to the country where the MNC’s parent company is located.
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while section 3 concludes.
2 The model
We employ a model that has two identical countries, A and B, and two identical multi-
national companies.7 Multinational company MNCi has headquarters with production
facilities in country i and an aﬃliate in country j (i 6= j). Domestic and foreign prof-
its before tax for MNCi are equal to πii and πij, respectively, where the first subscript
indicates where the headquarters are located and the second where profits are derived.
Aggregate profit before tax for MNCi is πi = πii + πij (i, j = A,B, i 6= j).
The MNCs produce homogenous goods, and face the inverse demand curve
pi = α− βxii − βxji, (1)
where pi is the price in country i, and xii and xji denote quantities supplied by the
domestic and foreign MNC, respectively. The production process is split into production
of intermediates and final goods. The former incurs a marginal cost c, while the latter
incurs a marginal cost d. We shall assume that all intermediates are produced at the
headquarters, while final production takes place locally. This implies that part of the
production of intermediates in country i is further processed in country i and the rest is
exported to the aﬃliate in country j for final processing there.
The aﬃliate of each MNC is charged a transfer price gi for intermediates that it
buys from its parent. The transfer price is potentially an instrument the MNCs can
use to shift profit from one country to the other in order to save taxes. In line with
most of the literature on transfer pricing we make the realistic assumption that it is
costly to conceal deviations in the transfer price from the true cost of production. More
7In some industries the long-run localization pattern of multinational companies may partly be de-
termined by tax incentives (e.g. for export-oriented MNCs) and partly by access to specific factors of
production. Our focus, however, is on MNCs where the foreign subsidiaries are primarily set up to serve
local markets, and we therefore treat the number of MNCs and aﬃliates in each country as exogenous.
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specifically, we assume that the concealment cost function is strictly convex, and equal
to Ci = δ(gi − c)2xij , where δ > 0, so that it is equally expensive to manipulate the
transfer price above or below marginal costs. This assumption can be interpreted as costs
that need to be incurred in order to conceal the true price of the product, for example by
hiring of lawyers or accountants (see, e.g., Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000).8.
In addition to the transfer price, the foreign aﬃliate pays a trade cost τ ≥ 0 for
each unit it receives from its headquarters. We emphasize that trade costs in our setting
should be interpreted as a synthetic measure of a wide range of barriers to trade including
transport costs, costs of frontier formalities, and diﬀering product standards. We do not
consider income generating tariﬀs, as these are typically of limited importance in the trade
between industrialized countries.
Profit before taxes by the parent firm located in country i is πii = (pi − c− d) xii +
(gi − c) xij − δ (gi − c)2 xij, while the profit level of the foreign plant equals πij = (pj −
τ −d− gi)xij. In order to leave the notation as simple as possible in the continuation, but
without loss of generality for the analysis to come9, we normalize marginal costs so that
c = d = 0. Hence, we rewrite profits as
πii = pixii + gixij − δg2i xij and πij = (pj − τ − gi)xij (2)
Total profits for MNCi before taxes are πi = pixii− δg2i xij +(pj − τ)xij, which makes
it clear that in the absence of a profit shifting motive, the optimal transfer price is equal
to marginal production costs (i.e., gi = 0).
We assume that the countries use separate accounting as foundation for their corporate
tax system, i.e. each country imposes a tax on the profits generated within its borders.
The aim of this tax code is to identify the precise receipts and expenditures attributable to
the corporation’s activities in each jurisdiction. Although repatriated profits in principle
are taxed in the country of residence, there is general agreement that due to deferral
8Alternatively, the costs may represent an increased probability of detection by the tax authorities as
modeled by Kant (1988)
9A proof of this is obtainable from the authors upon request.
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possibilities and limited tax credit rules, the source principle of taxation is eﬀectively in
operation in most OECD countries (Keen, 1993, and Tanzi and Bovenberg, 1990). Taking
this into account, global after tax profits of a multinational firm with headquarters in
country i are
Πi = (1− ti)πii + (1− tj)πij. (3)
We consider a game with two stages. In the first stage the two countries simultaneously
set their tax rates, tA and tB, as to maximize national welfare. In the second stage the
headquarters set the transfer prices to their foreign aﬃliates, and compete a´-la´ Cournot
in the two segmented end-user markets.
Stage 2: In the second stage, the multinational firm with its parent company in country
i maximizes (3) with respect to xii, xij and gi, taking the quantities supplied by the other
multinational firm (i.e., MNCj) and the tax rates as given. Using equations (1) and (2)
in (3), and diﬀerentiating with respect to gi yields
gi =
tj − ti
2δ(1− ti)
, (4)
which shows that MNCi wants to underinvoice its exports (gi < 0) if ti > tj , and thus
shift profits to the low tax country j. Similarly, an incentive to overinvoice (gi > 0) arises
when ti < tj and profits are shifted to country i. If it is prohibitively costly to manipulate
the transfer price (δ →∞), or if ti = tj - in which case no profit shifting motive exists -
it follows from (4) that the transfer price is set equal to marginal cost (i.e., gi = 0).
Diﬀerentiating (3) with respect to xii and xij we obtain the first order conditions for
xii and xij. Solving this simultaneously for the two MNCs and using (4), we have:
xii =
α+ τ
3
− 1
12
(ti − tj)2
βδ (1− ti) (1− tj)
,
xij =
α− 2τ
3
+
1
6
(ti − tj)2
βδ (1− ti) (1− tj)
. (5)
From (5) it is seen that the last term in the expression for both xii and xij is positive or
zero. It is zero if it is prohibitively expensive to manipulate the transfer prices (δ → ∞)
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or if ti = tj. Hence, the multinational exports more if it can manipulate the transfer price
than if it cannot.
Equation (5) also shows that a decrease in trade costs (τ ) increases exports and thus
intensifies import competition.10 All else equal, economic integration thus reduces domes-
tic profit (πii) and increases export income (πij). The total eﬀect of reduced trade costs
on global profit before taxes is therefore uncertain. However, a standard result in trade
theory is that there is a U-shaped relationship between global profit and trade costs, as
shown in Figure 1. To see the intuition for this result, note first that the direct eﬀect of
lower trade costs is that the cost level of the firms decreases. All else equal, economic
integration will therefore lead to higher profit. This is the reason why the profit curve
is downward-sloping to the left of τ 0 in Figure 1.11 However, economic integration also
implies that import competition increases. This has a negative eﬀect on the firms’ prof-
itability, and it is well known from international economics that this eﬀect dominates
if trade costs are initially high (because the firms then make almost all of their profit
domestically). This explains why the profit curve is upward-sloping to the right of τ 0.
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Figure 1: Global profit and economic integration.
10Notice that there will be no trade if τ ≥ α/2.
11In Figure 1 we have assumed that α = β = 1 and ti = tj.
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Stage 1: At the first stage each government sets its tax rate in order to maximize
national welfare, taking the taxes of the other country as given. National welfare is a
function of consumer surplus, profits that accrue to domestic residents and public good
provision. Assume that a share s ∈ [0, 1] of each multinational is owned by domestic
residents, while a share (1 − s) is owned by residents of a third country. Welfare in
country i is given by
Wi = CSi +G (Ti) + sΠi, (6)
where CSi =
1
2
(1− pi) (xii + xji) is consumer surplus in country i and G(Ti) is a public
good which is financed by tax revenue, Ti = ti(πii + πji).We assume that G
0
> 0 and
G
00
< 0.
The government in country i maximizes (6) with respect to ti, taking tj as given.
A symmetric equilibrium is characterized by tA = tB ≡ t∗ (* will be used to denote
equilibrium values). Instead of mechanically solving ∂Wi/∂ti = 0 simultaneously for the
two countries, it is instructive to derive the equilibrium tax rate t∗ by characterizing the
symmetric equilibrium. From equation (5) we find that ∂x∗ii/∂ti|ti=tj = ∂x∗ji/∂ti
¯¯
ti=tj
= 0
, which means that a small change in the tax rates from the symmetric equilibrium does
not have any eﬀect on supplied quantities or consumer surplus. Consequently, a marginal
increase in ti aﬀects welfare in country i only through its impact on the second and third
terms of (6) . The equilibrium is thus characterized by
0 =
∂W ∗i
∂ti
= G0
∂T ∗i
∂ti| {z }
Tax revenue eﬀect
+ s
∂Π∗i
∂ti| {z }
Profit ownership eﬀect
(7)
where G0 ≡ ∂G∗/∂Ti.
The diﬀerential ∂T ∗i /∂ti shows the change in tax revenue in country i due to a marginal
increase in ti. The first term in (7) is therefore labelled the tax revenue eﬀect. The second
term is labelled the profit-ownership eﬀect, and shows how a marginal increase in ti aﬀects
the domestic residents’ profit income from multinational i (sΠi). The higher the value of
s the more of the profits of MNCi is owned by residents of country i. All else equal,
therefore, this term is more important in the welfare function the higher the value of s.
10
To examine the impact of economic integration on tax rates and tax revenues, in other
words the impact of economic integration on the governments’ welfare maximization prob-
lem (cf. equation (7)) it is useful to first consider the special case where the multinationals
are fully owned by residents of a third country.
The multinationals are owned by third country residents (s = 0) With s = 0
the profit ownership eﬀect vanishes. Thus, equation (7) implies that each country sets its
tax rate so as to maximize domestic tax revenue only, and solving ∂T ∗i /∂ti = 0 we find
t∗
1− t∗ = δ
2α2 − 2ατ + 5τ2
3 (α− 2τ) , (8)
where the ratio t∗/ (1− t∗) is monotonically increasing in t∗.
From equation (8) it follows that t∗ = 1 if trade costs are prohibitively high (τ = α/2),
reflecting the fact that in absence of trade the MNCs cannot use the transfer price to shift
profit internationally. It is, therefore, optimal for each country to confiscate the whole
profit, since the MNCs are owned by foreigners.
Trade occurs if τ < α/2, and the countries will then compete for shifty profit. Other
things equal this puts a downward pressure on tax rates, and with complete integration
(τ = 0) we have t∗ = 2αδ/(2αδ + 3) < 1.12 More generally, we find that
∂
∂τ
µ
t∗
1− t∗
¶
= 2δα
2 + 5τ (α− τ )
3 (α− 2τ )2
> 0, (9)
which means that t∗ is monotonically increasing in τ . We may state:
Lemma 1. The tax revenue eﬀect indicates that the equilibrium tax rate (t∗) is in-
creasing in τ .
Lemma 1 is consistent with the view that economic integration (dτ < 0) makes cor-
porate tax bases more tax sensitive, which in turn forces the countries to reduce their tax
12Assuming δ <∞.
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rates. However, this does not mean that tax revenue falls. On the contrary, economic in-
tegration implies that tax revenue increases if the initial level of trade costs is suﬃciently
low. Specifically, in the neighborhood of τ = 0 we can use equations (5), (7) and (8) to
obtain
∂T ∗
∂τ
¯¯¯¯
τ=0
= − 8δ
2α3
9β (3 + 2δα)2
< 0. (10)
To see the intuition for equation (10), recall from Figure 1 that global corporate profit
before tax is a U-shaped function of τ . In particular, economic integration increases the
profit level of the firms if trade costs are low. Thereby the tax base in each country is
enlarged and this gives rise to higher tax revenue.
So far we have assumed that each multinational is owned by residents of a third
country. In order to asses the generality of our results, we next consider the case where
home country residents own a share of the domestic multinational firm (i.e., s > 0).
The multinationals are partly owned by domestic residents (s > 0) To find
the relationship between taxes and trade costs when s > 0 it is convenient to derive the
expression for the term ∂Π∗i /∂ti in equation (7). Using (3) we have13
∂Π∗i
∂ti
= −π∗ii = −
(α+ τ)2
9β < 0. (11)
Equation (11) measures the loss in profit for the domestic multinational subsequent to an
increase in ti, and allows us to rewrite first-order condition (7) as
0 =
∂W ∗i
∂ti
= −s(α+ τ )
2
9β +G
0∂T ∗i
∂ti
. (12)
The second term on the right hand side of (12) is the tax revenue eﬀect, which is discussed
in Lemma 1. Our attention here is on the profit ownership eﬀect (first term), which is
negative. Thus, when s > 0, the government sets a tax rate which is lower than the one
that maximizes tax revenue. Note that the absolute value of the profit ownership eﬀect
13Formally, ∂Π∗i /∂ti = −π∗ii + (1− t∗)
¡
∂π∗ii/∂ti + ∂π∗ij/∂ti
¢
, where the last bracket equals zero since
the net eﬀect of profit shifting is zero: ∂π∗ii/∂ti = −∂π∗ij/∂ti = − (α− 2τ) / [6βδ (1− t)] < 0.
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is increasing in τ , suggesting, ceteris paribus, that the equilibrium tax rate is lower the
higher the level of trade costs:
Lemma 2: When s > 0, the profit-ownership eﬀect indicates that the equilibrium tax
rate (t∗) is decreasing in τ .
The reason why the profit ownership eﬀect suggests that the tax rate is decreasing
in τ , is that the domestic multinational makes a higher profit at home the higher the
level of trade costs (reflecting weaker import competition). If the firm is partly owned by
domestic residents, the government therefore has smaller incentives to set a high tax rate
the larger the value of τ . Moreover, for s > 0 it is generally not optimal to set the tax
rate equal to 100% when trade is prohibitively expensive, because a high tax rate reduces
private income in each country. Indeed, for s = 1 it is optimal to set the tax rate such
that the marginal utility of private income is equal to the marginal utility of the public
good.14
Solving (12) we find
t∗
1− t∗ =
1
3
2α2 − 2ατ + 5τ2
α− 2τ δ −
1
3
δ (α+ τ)
2
α− 2τ
s
G0
, (13)
which is an implicit expression for t∗, since G0 is also a function of the tax rate.
The first term on the right-hand side of (13) corresponds to the tax revenue eﬀect
and it suggests that t∗ is increasing in τ ,while the second term corresponds to the profit
ownership eﬀect, and indicates that t∗ is decreasing in τ . In general we cannot say which
of these eﬀects dominates, but economic integration (lower trade costs) is more likely
to reduce the equilibrium tax rate the smaller the value of s (the weaker is the profit
ownership eﬀect).15 From equation (13) we further see that the equilibrium tax rate is
14The first-order condition for the optimal tax rate when trade costs are prohibitively high is derived
by solving (12) for τ = α/2. We then find that the tax rate is implicitly given by the condition G0 = s.
The first-order condition holds provided that G0 = s defines a tax rate t∗ ≤ 1.0. Otherwise, the optimal
tax rate is t∗ = 1.0 (as is the case when s = 0).
15Consider the simple example where Gi(Ti) = Ti, which means that G
0 = 1. We then find ∂t∂τ =
6δ α2+5ατ−5τ2
(3α−6τ+2δα2−2δατ+5δτ2)2 > 0 for s = 0 and
∂t
∂τ = −6
δ
(δα−2δτ+3)2 < 0 for s = 1.
13
increasing in G0, all else equal. The reason for this is that the countries have stronger
incentives to increase the tax rates the higher the marginal utility of public goods. We
can now state:
Proposition 1. Other things equal, the equilibrium tax rate is increasing in the
marginal utility of public funds and decreasing in the country’s ownership in the domestic
multinational. Economic integration is more likely to lead to a lower equilibrium tax rate
the larger the share of the domestic multinational that is owned by foreigners.
Figure 2 illustrates how the tax rate depends on the level of trade costs for two diﬀerent
ownership shares.16 In the case where home country residents own half of the domestic
multinational (s = 1/2) we see that economic integration reduces the equilibrium tax rate.
This result is in line with the conventional wisdom from the tax competition literature
(Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986, Wilson 1986), and reflects the fact that the tax revenue
eﬀect dominates.
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Figure 2: Economic integration and tax rates.
16See the Appendix for parameter values and the functional form of G(Ti).
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For high levels of trade costs (τ > τ 0), Figure 2 shows that economic integration implies
that the equilibrium tax rate falls also for s = 1, because lower trade costs make the tax
bases more tax sensitive. However, the profit ownership eﬀect dominates for lower levels
of trade costs and economic integration increases the equilibrium tax rate. This outcome
fits empirical data showing that some countries have increased their corporate tax rates
between the mid 1980s and the millennium.17 Finland, for example, had a corporate tax
rate of 25 percent in 1993, but has later increased it so that it in 2003 is 29 percent.
Furthermore, the German business tax has increased steadily since the early 80s (See
Kelders and Kotenburger, 2003).18
Above, we showed that economic integration leads to higher tax revenue in the neigh-
borhood of τ = 0 when the multinationals are fully owned by residents of a third country.
This happens despite the fact that economic integration reduces the equilibrium tax rate
when s = 0. If s > 0 the profit ownership eﬀect implies that economic integration may
actually lead to a higher tax rate, strengthening the tendency for economic integration to
increase tax revenue. This is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the relationship between
trade costs and tax revenue. In the Appendix we oﬀer a formal proof of the following
result:
Proposition 2: Economic integration in the neighborhood of τ = 0 leads to higher
equilibrium tax revenue.
17E.g., Finland and Norway.
18Consistent with Proposition 1, we also see from Figure 2 that the equilibrium tax rate is lower the
higher the value of s, suggesting that the ownership composition matters for the tax rate.
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Figure 3: Economic integration and tax revenue.
Figure 3 shows that tax revenue may rise if economic integration has proceeded far
and this seems to be in line with empirical data. Devereaux, Griﬃth and Klemm (2002),
for example, find that tax revenue has remained broadly stable, but that it has increased
for some countries (among them the U.K.).
It is important to note that trade barriers are neglected in the standard tax competition
literature. Competition among countries to attract capital or shifty profits thus leads to
too low taxes and falling tax revenue due to the fiscal externality arising in the tax
equilibrium (see, e.g., Wilson (1999)). In contrast, we find that economic integration
may mitigate the loss of tax revenue and even lead to higher tax rates (and an increase
in welfare). This is almost the opposite view on tax competition than in the standard
literature.
3 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have investigated how a reduction of trade costs, inclusive of commu-
nication costs and other barriers to trade, aﬀects equilibrium tax rates in an economy
where multinationals engage in profit shifting. We have found two opposing forces that
aﬀect tax rates. The first is that economic integration makes the corporate tax base more
mobile and thus tax more sensitive. All else equal, this suggests that the tax rates will
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fall. The second eﬀect pertains to the fact that economic integration allows foreign firms
to capture a larger share of the domestic market. This eﬀect indicates that taxes should
rise, since there is an incentive to shift the burden of taxation onto foreigners. Which
of these two eﬀects dominates, depends on the level of economic integration and on the
ownership structure of firms. However, independent of whether the equilibrium tax rate
falls or increases, we have demonstrated that if trade costs are low, economic integration
leads to higher tax revenue due to the gains from free trade.
Our results seem to fit with empirical studies Devereaux, Griﬃth and Klemm (2002)
find that tax revenues on corporate income as proportion of GDP have remained stable
or even increased for some countries since the early 1960s.19 The stability of tax revenue
seems to be in line with the tax base eﬀect we have identified. For the same sample of
countries they show that statutory tax rates have fallen, which is in line with our main
scenario. There are however outlier countries where the statutory tax rate has risen. One
such country is Finland, which has become significantly more integrated with the world
economy after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This case fits with the alternative result
on tax rates that we have presented.
Our study suggests that empirical research on tax rates and tax revenues should
focus on how integrated countries are. A pattern of falling tax revenues are consistent
with high barriers to trade, whilst higher revenues are consistent with a high degree of
economic integration. A final comment to the empirical predictions of our model is this.
If further economic integration implies lower barriers to trade, more foreign ownership of
the domestic tax base, and a continuing strong presence of multinationals, then the new
wave of tax reforms that is about to be initiated in many OECD countries may actually
entail higher corporate tax rates and - despite this - lead to higher tax revenue.
4 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
19Devereaux, Griﬃth and Klemm (2002)
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From equation (13) we find that the tax rate at τ = 0 equals
t =
¡
2G
0 − s
¢
δα
(2G0 − s) δα+ 3G0 (14)
In the symmetric equilibrium we have T1= T2 ≡ T, with
T = t
2α2 + 5τ2 − 2ατ
9β (15)
Note from equations (13) and (15) that we have respectively t = t(τ , G0(T1(τ)) and
T = T (τ , t(τ )), which implies
dt
dτ =
∂t
∂τ +
∂t
∂G0G
00 dT
dτ (16)
and
dT
dτ =
∂T
∂τ +
∂T
∂t
dt
dτ . (17)
Solving (16 and (17) simultaneously we find
dT1
dτ = −
∂T1
∂τ +
∂T1
∂t
∂t
∂τ
−1 + ∂t∂G0G
00 ∂T1
∂t
(18)
and
dt
dτ = −
∂t
∂τ +
∂t
∂G0
∂T1
∂τ G
00
−1 + ∂t∂G0
∂T1
∂t G
00 . (19)
Using that
∂t
∂G0
¯¯¯¯
τ=0
= 3δs α
(−2G0δα+ sδα− 3G0)2
(20)
∂t
∂τ
¯¯¯¯
τ=0
= −6δG0 2s−G
0
(−2G0δα+ sδα− 3G0)2
(21)
∂T1
∂τ
¯¯¯¯
τ=0
= −2
9
t
α
β (22)
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∂T1
∂t
¯¯¯¯
τ=0
=
2
9
α2
β (23)
we find from (18) that
dT1
dτ = −2δα
2 4G
0δα
¡
G
0 − s
¢
+ s2δα+ 9sG0
9β [(2G0 − s) δα+ 3G0]2 − 6α3δsG00
(24)
The denominator in (24) is always positive, since G
00
< 0. Also the numerator is positive.
To see this, note that a suﬃcient condition for the numerator N ≡ 4G0δα
¡
G
0 − s
¢
+
s2δα + 9sG0 to be increasing in G0 is that G0 > s/2 (dN/dG0 = 8δα
¡
G
0 − s/2
¢
+ 9s).
This we know must be true for any positive tax rate from equation (14). Since we further
find that the numerator is positive for G
0
= s/2, it follows that the numerator must be
positive for all relevant values of G
0
and s. It thus follows that trade liberalization around
τ = 0 unambiguously leads to higher tax income:
dT1
dτ
¯¯¯¯
τ=0
< 0
We likewise find
dt
dτ
¯¯¯¯
τ=0
= −6δ
9β
¡
2s−G0
¢
G
0 − sα3G00
9β ((2G0 − s) δα+ 3G0)2 − 6α3δsG00
≶ 0
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